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We show that bounds like those of Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (J. Econ.
Theory, 2000) as well as of Gradwohl et al. (Math. Oper. Res., 2009) on the
number of α-pivotal agents can be obtained by decomposition of variance.
All these bounds have a similar asymptotic behaviour, up to constant fac-
tors. Our bound is weaker than that of Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky, but we
require only pairwise independent—rather than independent—types. Our
result strengthens the bound of Gradwohl et al.
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1 Introduction
In a mechanism design problem, an agent is called α-pivotal with respect to some col-
lective outcome if a variation in the agent’s type can lead to a change in the expected
outcome of at least α. Often, α-pivotality leads to necessary conditions for a mechanism
to be incentive-compatible or individually rational. A participation fee, for instance,
may make α-pivotality a precondition for voluntary participation, as an agent will want
to pay the fee only if he can inﬂuence the outcome suﬃciently.
Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2000a) provide an upper bound on the number of α-pivotal
agents if the outcome is bounded, the agents’ types are independent, and the type space
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1is ﬁnite. The upper bound depends on the distribution of types as well as on α, but is
independent from the number of agents. This result has several interesting applications:
It allows the derivation of upper bounds for the probability that a public project is
realized (Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky, 2000a; Neeman, 2004), or for the size of a public
project (Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky, 2000b; Birulin, 2006). Al-Najjar (2001) uses it
in the analysis of authority relationships. Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2007) prove
the eﬃciency of competitive mechanisms if the number of traders is suﬃciently large.
Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2001) derive an upper bound for the number of players
not playing the short-term best response in a repeated game, and Gerardi and Yariv
(2008) analyse how to design an optimal mechanism for information acquisition through
a committee. Inﬂuence is an important issue in agenda-setting and voting models, as,
for instance, analysed by Gersbach (2009), when participation in the political process is
costly.
Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2000a) demonstrate their result by explicitly constructing
a mechanism in which the number of α-pivotal agents is maximal. This mechanism is
a majority voting. The topic was taken up recently by Gradwohl et al. (2009), who
generalize the results of Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky in various directions—in particular,
they introduce the notion of (p,α)-pivotality, relax the assumption of independent types
to pairwise independence, and consider the inﬂuence of coalitions. For proving their
result, the authors consider binary type spaces ﬁrst and then reduce the general case to
this special case.
The purpose of the present note is to show that similar upper bounds for the number
of α-pivotal or (p,α)-pivotal players can be reached in a direct way by a very simple
argument based on decomposition of variance. Our proof highlights the role of Al-Najjar
and Smorodinsky’s assumption that the type space is ﬁnite. The method we use is closely
related to an argument in Appendix 1 of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990, p. 364), where
the idea appears as “Bessel’s inequality”. Our bound on the number of α-pivotal players
will turn out to be less sharp than the one by Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky, but much
easier to compute. It displays a similar asymptotic behaviour, up to a constant factor.
Our result for (p,α)-pivotality is somewhat sharper than that of Gradwohl et al.
The present paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we develop the main argument.
In Section 3 we derive our upper bound for the number of α-pivotal agents. In Section 4
we compare this bound to the result of Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2000a). In Section 5
we refer to Gradwohl et al. (2009) and consider (p,α)-pivotality.
2Throughout the paper, we assume that all random variables are deﬁned on some prob-
ability space, which we do not mention explicitly. The probability measure is denoted
by P.
2 Decomposition of Variance
The following proposition is our central argument.
Proposition 1. Let X be a real-valued random variable with ﬁnite variance, and suppose





Proof. For i = 1,...,N, let Yi := E(X | Ti), and let Z := X −
PN
i=1 Yi. Since X =
Z +
PN











For i 6= j, the random variables Yi and Yj are independent because Ti and Tj are
independent; hence Cov(Yi,Yj) = 0. By the Law of Iterated Expectations, we have
EYi = EX for all i = 1,...,N. Together with the Ti-measurability of Yi, this yields
Cov(Yi,Z) = Cov(Yi,X) −
N X
j=1





− EYi · EX − VarYi = E

E(Yi · X | Ti)

− (EYi)2 − VarYi
= E

Yi · E(X | Ti)

− (EYi)2 − VarYi = VarYi − VarYi = 0.
As VarZ ≥ 0, the assertion now follows from Equation (1).
1Note that for each i, the conditional expectation E(X | Ti) is a random variable; it can be seen as a
function of Ti.
33 The Bound for a-Pivotality
We adopt the setup of Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2000a). We consider a set {1,...,N}
of agents. The type of agent i is given by the random variable Ti. We assume the random
variables Ti to be pairwise independent. Further, we assume:
Finiteness Assumption. For each i, the support of Ti, denoted by Ti, is a ﬁnite set.






and note that ε > 0.
The random variable X represents some collective outcome.2 We assume that X has
ﬁnite variance. The following deﬁnition is due to Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2000a,
p. 323):
Deﬁnition 1. Suppose the Finiteness Assumption holds. Let α > 0. We say that
i ∈ {1,...,N} is α-pivotal for X if
max
t∈Ti
E(X | Ti = t) − min
t∈Ti
E(X | Ti = t) ≥ α. (2)
The term on the left-hand side of the inequality is called the inﬂuence of agent i.
To illustrate this deﬁnition, we give an interpretation for the case of a direct mechanism
if the agents are risk-neutral, types are independent, and each agent’s type is private
information to this agent. Let X be the outcome of the mechanism if the agents truly
report their types. The outcome X need not be a function of T1,...,TN; our arguments
hold as long as agent i’s expected utility from reporting type ti ∈ Ti is given by E(X |
Ti = ti). Then, the quantity on the left-hand side of Inequality (2) is an upper bound for
what agent i can gain from misreporting his type.3 This interpretation underlies most
of the examples cited in the Introduction.
2Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2000a, p. 321) give the following examples: “the level of pollution,
output of team production, a principal’s reward, etc., or the probability of a binary outcome, e.g.,
the probability that a public project is undertaken.”
3If types are not independent, one has to be very careful with this interpretation of α-pivotality.
Consider, for instance, N > 1 agents who are either all of type 0 or all of type 1. The outcome
X shall be zero if the agents are of type 0 and one if the agents are of type 1. In this setting, the
inﬂuence of each agent is one, but, with the mechanism appropriately designed, what an agent could
gain from misreporting his type could be strictly larger than one, since a single agent’s misreporting
4As a consequence of the Finiteness Assumption, α-pivotality transforms into a lower
bound for the variance of the conditional expectation E(X | Ti).
Proposition 2. If i is α-pivotal, then VarE(X | Ti) ≥ 1
2εα2.
Proof. For each i, the conditional expectation E(X | Ti) is a random variable; it takes
each of the values ai := maxt∈Ti E(X | Ti = t) and bi := mint∈Ti E(X | Ti = t) with a
probability of at least ε. Taking into account that bi ≤ EX ≤ ai and that i is α-pivotal,
we reach
VarE(X | Ti) = E
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2ε(ai − bi)2 ≥ 1
2εα2.












We compare our bound to the one of Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2000a). They deﬁne
K∗
α to be the largest4 integer K satisfying R(ε,K) ≥ α, with R(ε,K) being a player’s
inﬂuence in a majority decision of K agents, where every agent votes “Yes” with a
probability of ε, “No” with a probability of ε, and abstains from voting with a probability
leads to a reported strategy proﬁle that is not within the support of the type distribution. Of course,
in this example, the agents’ types are not even pairwise independent, so our analysis does not apply,
anyway. The same problem of interpretation, however, would appear in an example of Gradwohl et
al. (2009, Sec. 4.1., p. 979), to which our analysis does apply. In their example, in which there are
N = 2
k −1 agents (k ≥ 2), types are identically Bernoulli-distributed and pairwise independent, but
the support concentrates on the zero vector as well as on N other strategy proﬁles, in each of which
exactly (N +1)/2 agents are of type 1. Again, a single agent’s misreporting would lead to a strategy
proﬁle outside the support, which means that the inﬂuence introduced in Deﬁnition 1 need not be
an upper bound for what an agent can gain from misreporting his type.
4Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2000a) deﬁne it to be the smallest integer, which is obviously a mistake.
5of 1 − 2ε. The authors prove that if the range of X is a subset of [0;1], the number of
α-pivotal players is bounded by K∗
α, and that in a symmetric environment this bound is





for K → ∞. (3)






πεα2 for α → 0. (4)
Proof. Let ˜ Kα := 1/(πεα2). By the results of Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2000a), we
have K∗














































This yields ˜ Kα/K∗
α → 1 for α → 0.
In order to compare this to the bound from Theorem 1, we ﬁrst note that by the
following—rather trivial—observation, range(X) ⊆ [0;1] establishes a constraint on
VarX.
Proposition 4. Let Z be a real-valued random variable such that range(Z) ⊆ [z1;z2]
for some z1,z2 ∈ R, z1 ≤ z2. Then, VarZ ≤ 1
4(z2 − z1)2.
Proof. We only have to consider the case z1 < z2. Let λ := (z2−z1)/2, z∗ := (z1+z2)/2,
and ˜ Z := (Z − z∗)/λ. Then,











where the last inequality follows from | ˜ Z| ≤ 1.
5Two functions f(x) and g(x), with g(x) 6= 0 for all x, are deﬁned to be asymptotically equivalent for
x → x0 (notation: f(x) ' g(x) for x → x0) if f(x)/g(x) → 1 for x → x0.
6By Proposition 4, range(X) ⊆ [0;1] implies VarX ≤ 1




which diﬀers from the right-hand side of (4) only by a constant factor of π/2. As the
fact that this factor is strictly larger than 1 suggests, and as an explicit calculation of
K∗
α for some examples shows, the upper bound 1/(2εα2) is not sharp.
The diﬀerence in the upper bounds might be due to the fact that we require only pairwise
independence, as compared to the independence assumption of Al-Najjar and Smorodin-
sky (2000a). It remains, however, an open question whether it is possible to construct
a model with pairwise independent, but not independent types in which the number of
α-pivotal agents is strictly larger than K∗
α.
5 The Bound for (p,a)-Pivotality
Gradwohl et al. (2009, p. 972) modify the concept of α-pivotality by deﬁning (p,α)-
pivotality. We are going to use this notion in the following sense:
Deﬁnition 2. 6 Let α > 0 and p ∈ [0;1]. A player i is called (p,α)-pivotal for X if
P






This deﬁnition is meaningful even if the supports of the type variables Ti are not ﬁnite;
hence we can drop the Finiteness Assumption. Like α-pivotality, (p,α)-pivotality enables
us to bound the variances of the conditional expectations E(X | Ti) from below, so we
can replicate our arguments from Section 3. The following proposition is the analogue
to Proposition 2.
Proposition 5. If player i is (p,α)-pivotal, then VarE(X | Ti) ≥ pα2.
Proof. This immediately follows from Chebysh¨ ev’s inequality, which says that
P
 E(X | Ti) − EX





6Gradwohl et al. (2009) use strict inequalities (“>” instead of “≥”) in their deﬁnition. For the present
paper, the given—weaker—deﬁnition of (p,α)-pivotality is suﬃcient.















E(X | Ti = t) ≤ EX ≤ max
t∈Ti
E(X | Ti = t),









This is by factor 2 worse than the bound given by Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 corresponds to Theorem 2.1 in Gradwohl et al. (2009), which says that if
range(X) ⊆ [−1;1], the number of (p,α)-pivotal players is not greater than 8/(pα2).
By Proposition 4, range(X) ⊆ [−1;1] implies VarX ≤ 1; hence Theorem 2 yields a
bound of 1/(pα2). Theorem 2 is thus stronger than Theorem 2.1 of Gradwohl et al.
This strengthening can be transferred to Theorem 2.2 of Gradwohl et al. by building the
proof on the above Theorem 2 instead of Theorem 2.1.
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